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rate of inflation, independent of the employed
concept of inflation compensation. Finally, we pro-
vide evidence that Federal Reserve communication
and surprises in monetary policy actions bear on
the uncertainty surrounding the expected rate of
inflation. For one concept of inflation expectations,
we find that Federal Reserve communication
reduces uncertainty about the future rate of inflation,
while surprises in monetary policy actions increase
this uncertainty. For the other concept of inflation
compensation, we find no such effects.
RELATED LITERATURE
The effect of macroeconomic announcements
on inflation compensation embedded in the market
valuation of expected cash flows of nominal Treasury
securities versus TIIS has been investigated before.
The studies most closely related to our work
are Sack (2000) and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2003). Using daily data, Sack (2000) analyzes how
surprises in the releases of six monthly macro-
economic data series affect the inflation compensa-
tion embedded in Treasury securities for the period
1997-99. These macroeconomic data series are the
consumer price index (CPI), the CPI excluding food
and energy (core CPI), the producer price index for
finished goods (PPI), nonfarm payroll employment,
retail sales, and the NAPM index.1 Sack matches the
on-the-run 10-year TIIS with a portfolio of nominal
Treasury STRIPS (Separate Trading of Interest and
Principal Securities) that replicates the pattern of
expected payments of the TIIS.2 The author finds a
1 The National Association for Purchasing Managers’ (NAPM) index is
now simply the Purchasing Managers Index; it is released by the
Institute for Supply Management.
2 The Treasury STRIPS program, which was introduced in January 1985,
“lets investors hold and trade the individual interest and principal
components of eligible Treasury notes and bonds as separate securities”
(www.publicdebt.treas.gov/of/ofstrips.htm).
Monetary Policy Actions, Macroeconomic 
Data Releases, and Inflation Expectations
Kevin L. Kliesen and Frank A. Schmid
D
o surprises in macroeconomic data releases
and monetary policy actions of the Federal
Reserve lead economic agents to update
their beliefs about the rate of inflation? If so, which
macroeconomic data releases matter for inflation
expectations? Does Federal Reserve communication
(for example, speeches and testimonies by Fed
officials) affect the uncertainty surrounding the
rate of inflation that economic agents expect for
the following 10 years? These are some of the
questions we are trying to answer in this paper.
We gauge inflation expectations by two different
concepts of inflation compensation, both of which
are derived from the market valuation of the
expected cash flows of nominal Treasury securities
versus inflation-indexed Treasury securities (TIIS). We
look at 35 macroeconomic data series (for example,
the monthly change in nonfarm payroll employ-
ment) and determine whether daily changes in infla-
tion compensation are associated with the surprise
component in these series. We define the surprise
component as the difference between the expected
and the actually released value of the series, normal-
ized by the degree of uncertainty surrounding these
expectations. The time period of our analysis is
January 31, 1997, to June 30, 2003, for one concept
of inflation compensation and January 4, 1999, to
June 30, 2003, for the other. For the 35 macroecon-
omic data series, we find the following: for 17, the
surprise component in the announcement has no
bearing on inflation expectations; for 5, the surprise
component has an effect on one measure of inflation
expectations, but not on the other; for 13, the sur-
prise component in the release consistently affects
inflation expectations, independent of the employed
concept of inflation compensation. Further, we show
that monetary policy actions that are tighter or easier
than expected by the federal funds futures market
have a statistically significant effect on the expected
MAY/JUNE 2004      9
Kevin L. Kliesen is an economist and Frank A. Schmid is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Jason Higbee and Thomas
Pollmann provided research assistance.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2004, 86(3), pp. 9-21.
© 2004, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
 Kliesen and Schmid REVIEW
10 MAY/JUNE 2004
statistically significant response of inflation expec-
tations to surprises in the CPI, the core CPI, retail
sales, and the NAPM index.
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003) analyze
the response of inflation compensation embedded in
one-year nominal versus inflation-adjusted forward
interest rates to surprises in macroeconomic data
releases and Federal Reserve monetary policy
actions—that is, changes to the Federal Open Market
Committee’s (FOMC) federal funds target rate. The
forward rates are derived from the yields of 10-year
Treasury securities—the TIIS and nominal securities.
The pair of one-year forward rates that the authors
study is the one for the 12-month time window
between the maturity dates of the on-the-run 10-
year TIIS and the (off-the-run) TIIS issued 12 months
earlier. Prior to July 2002, and starting in 1997, 10-
year TIIS were issued only once per year, in January.
This implies that the authors analyze changes to
the inflation rate that is expected to prevail during
a 12-month time window that starts, on average, 8.5
years from the time of the data release. The sample
period runs from January 1997 through July 2002
and covers 39 macroeconomic data series. The
authors show that the rate of inflation expected to
prevail in about nine years’ time correlates positively
with surprises in consumer confidence, consumer
credit, the employment cost index (ECI), gross
domestic product (GDP, advance), new home sales,
and retail sales and negatively with surprises in the
federal funds target rate. The authors conclude (on
p. 2) that their “empirical findings suggest that pri-
vate agents adjust their expectations of the long-
run inflation rate in response to macroeconomic
and monetary policy surprises.”
Like Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), we
analyze Treasury securities with a 10-year maturity.
Unlike those authors, we study the average inflation
rate expected for the next 10 years rather than the
value expected for a 12-month window late in this
time period. In other words, we make no statement
about whether (and, if so, the degree to which) sur-
prises in monetary policy actions and macroecon-
omic data releases affect the rate of inflation that
economic agents expect to prevail in 8 to 9 years.
Another study related to ours is by Kohn and
Sack (2003), who study the effect of Federal Reserve
communication on financial variables but make no
attempt to gauge the influence that Chairman
Greenspan’s speeches and testimonies have on the
level of Treasury yields. Rather, the authors measure
the effect of Fed communication on Treasury yield
volatility. These authors investigate the effect that
Federal Reserve communication has on various
financial variables by using daily observations for
the period January 3, 1989, through April 7, 2003.
Federal Reserve communication comprises state-
ments released by the FOMC and, since June 1996,
congressional testimonies and speeches delivered
by Chairman Greenspan. Among the financial vari-
ables Kohn and Sack analyze are the yields (to matu-
rity) of the 2-year and 10-year Treasury notes. These
authors find that statements of the FOMC and testi-
monies of Chairman Greenspan have a statistically
significant impact on the variance of 2-year and
10-year Treasury note yields; no such effect was
found for Chairman Greenspan's speeches. We follow
Kohn and Sack (2003) and study the effect of Federal
Reserve communication on the (conditional) volatil-
ity of inflation compensation—that is, on the uncer-
tainty that surrounds the future rate of inflation.
MEASURES OF INFLATION 
COMPENSATION
In 1997, the U.S. Treasury introduced TIIS. These
securities are issued alongside traditional (nominal)
Treasury securities. Both types of securities are endowed
with a fixed coupon yield—that is, the coupon
payment per annum as a percent of the principal.
Unlike the principal of the nominal Treasury, which
is fixed for the lifetime of the security, the principal
of the TIIS is adjusted daily to past changes in the
rate of inflation, as measured by the (not seasonally
adjusted) CPI for all urban consumers. The coupon
payments of TIIS are made off of the inflation-
adjusted principal. If the rate of inflation turns neg-
ative, the principal is adjusted downward, possibly
dropping below the par amount at issue. At maturity,
TIIS are redeemed at their inflation-adjusted princi-
pal or par value at issue, whichever is greater.
It has become common practice to gauge infla-
tion expectations—that is, expectations about the
future, average rate of change in the CPI—from the
inflation rate at which the market prices of compa-
rable TIIS and nominal Treasury securities break
even. To illustrate the theoretical motivation of this
concept, consider, as an example, two default-free
securities with annual coupon payments, identical
coupon yield, an original principal of $1, and a time
to maturity of one year. One is a nominal Treasury
security and the other is a TIIS. For the two securi-
ties to deliver the same return to an investor who is
indifferent to inflation risk (but not to inflation, of
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course), the following equation must hold:
(1)
where c is the coupon yield, π is the expected rate of
inflation, and p
n and p
i are the prices of the nominal
security and the TIIS, respectively. Solving equation




i are the yields to maturity of the
nominal security and the TIIS, respectively. Equation
(2) states that the break-even inflation rate, π ˆ—that
is, the expected rate of inflation at which the two
securities trade at the same price—can be approxi-
mated by the difference in the yields to maturity
between a nominal and an inflation-indexed security.
For securities of more than one year to maturity,
matters are more complex but the same principle
applies.
Although the break-even rate of inflation makes
up the bulk of the inflation compensation embedded
in the market valuation of the expected cash flows
of nominal securities versus TIIS, there is also com-
pensation for inflation risk. Hence, the embedded
inflation compensation exceeds the expected rate
of inflation. Further, for positive rates of inflation,
the payment stream on TIIS is back-loaded compared
with the cash flow of nominal Treasury securities.
This is because the TIIS principal and, hence, the
coupon payments grow with the price level. Because
the payment stream of TIIS is back-loaded, their
duration with respect to the real (that is, inflation-
adjusted) term structure of interest rates is longer
than the duration of nominal Treasury securities.
In other words, the two types of securities do not
have the same price sensitivity to real interest rates.
Hence, the real-interest-rate risk (and thus the
amount of compensation for this type of risk) might
differ between the two securities; this may distort
the measured inflation compensation. For technical
details on the differences between the two securities,
see Emmons (2000) and Sack (2000).
A simple and readily available concept of infla-
tion compensation is the difference in yields to
maturity between the on-the-run nominal Treasury
security and the on-the-run TIIS of the same original


































expectations has four major disadvantages. First,
and most importantly, the market for nominal
Treasury securities is more liquid than the market
for TIIS, which may cause the yield spread to under-
state the expected rate of inflation by a liquidity
premium (Sack, 2000). Second, nominal Treasury
securities and TIIS might not have the same duration
with respect to real interest rates, which might cause
the compensation for real-interest-rate risk in the
yields of the two securities to differ. Third, the two
types of securities might not be issued at the same
dates and with the same frequency. Hence, the two
on-the-run securities might not have the same
remaining time to maturity. For instance, whereas
nominal 10-year Treasuries are issued several times
per year, the corresponding inflation-indexed securi-
ties are issued only once (1997-2001) or twice (2002)
per year. Fourth, the remaining time to maturity of
on-the-run securities varies because new securities
are not issued every trading day.
To avoid some of the drawbacks that come with
the simple difference in yields between the on-the-
run nominal and inflation-indexed securities, we
derive inflation compensation from a smoothed
zero-coupon yield curve estimated from off-the-run
nominal Treasury coupon securities. We use two
different measures for the inflation-indexed yield.
The first measure uses the on-the-run TIIS—the OTR
measure. The other measure uses a smoothed zero-
coupon yield curve estimated from TIIS, which allows
us to compare the nominal and inflation-indexed
yields at constant maturity—the CM measure.
THE DATA
Our analysis covers the period from January 31,
1997, to June 30, 2003, for the OTR measure, and
from January 5, 1999, to June 30, 2003, for the CM
measure. Each period begins on the starting date of
the respective daily data series, provided by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Both series contain missing values (OTR: 53; CM:
16)—that is, have trading days for which no OTR or
CM observation is on record. The macroeconomic
data releases are from Money Market Services. The
dataset comprises median polled forecast values
for 38 macroeconomic data series, along with the
sample standard deviations of these forecast values.
The Money Market Services survey is conducted
every Friday morning among senior economists
and bond traders with major commercial banks,
brokerage houses, and some consulting firms mostly
in the greater New York, Chicago, and San Francisco
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areas. Among these 38 series in the survey, there
are three items—CPI, PPI, and retail sales—for which
there also exists a “core” concept. Whereas the
comprehensive items of the CPI and the PPI include
food and energy items, the respective core measures
do not. For retail sales, the narrowly defined concept
excludes automotive sales. In the regression analysis,
we exclude the three “core” concepts, which leaves
us with 35 macroeconomic variables.3Data that were
released on days when the markets were closed were
moved to the next trading day—the day on which
this information could be priced in the marketplace.
We try to relate daily changes in inflation com-
pensation to the surprise component in macro-
economic data releases. We define the surprise
component as the difference between the actual
and the median forecast values, normalized by the
sample standard deviation of the individual fore-
casts.4 We also control for Federal Reserve commu-
nication and actions. Our concept of Federal Reserve
communication comprises (i) Chairman Greenspan’s
semi-annual testimony to Congress (formerly known
as Humphrey-Hawkins Testimony) and (ii) speeches
and other testimonies of Chairman Greenspan.
Consistent with the macroeconomic data releases,
we moved Federal Reserve communication to the
next trading day if this communication occurred
after-hours (that is, after the data input for the
inflation compensation measures were recorded)
or on days on which there was no trading. Finally,
we control for the surprise component in changes
(or the absence thereof) of the federal funds target
rate, which we measure as suggested by Kuttner
(2001) and discussed by Watson (2002). For each
scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meeting, we
scaled up by 30/(k+1) the change of the price of
the federal funds futures contract for the current
month on the day of the FOMC meeting, t, where
t+k denotes the last calendar day of the month.5
Note that this variable is not on the same scale as
the surprise component in the macroeconomic
data releases. In a sensitivity analysis, we use an
alternative measure of the surprise component in
monetary policy actions. This alternative measure,
devised by Poole and Rasche (2000), rests on price
changes of federal funds futures contracts also.6
Table 1 shows the frequency with which releases
of the 38 macroeconomic data series match recorded
OTR and CM inflation compensation during the two
respective sample periods. The numbers of data
releases during the sample period are in parentheses,
and the differences in the two numbers are due to
missing values. We also report matches for scheduled
and unscheduled FOMC meetings—the federal funds
target variable, the surprise component of which
was calculated as outlined above—and the two
Federal Reserve communication variables defined
above—(i) semi-annual testimony to Congress and
(ii) Greenspan speeches, testimonies other than
semi-annual testimony to Congress. The only weekly
series in the dataset, initial jobless claims, has the
highest frequency. The next-to-highest frequency
is observed for testimonies other than semi-annual
testimony to Congress, followed by monthly data
releases, FOMC actions (federal funds target), quar-
terly data releases, and the Chairman’s semi-annual
testimonies to Congress. An exception is nonfarm
productivity, which entered the Money Market
Services dataset during the sample period; the first
surveyed number refers to the first quarter of 1999.
Table 2, center column, offers a frequency dis-
tribution for the coincidence of surprises in macro-
economic data releases (Money Market Services
survey) and monetary policy actions. For instance,
for the OTR measure of inflation expectations, 453
of the 1,555 trading days analyzed had no surprises
in data releases or monetary actions, possibly
because no data were released or no action taken;
615 trading days (40 percent) had more than one
surprise; and 270 (17 percent) had more than two
surprises. Table 2, right column, offers a frequency
distribution with Federal Reserve communication
included.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our empirical approach rests on the following
regression equation:
3 As will be discussed, our exclusion of the “core” variables did not
materially change our empirical results.
4 Fleming and Remolona (1997, 1999) calculate the surprise component
by normalizing the difference between the actual and the forecast
values by the mean absolute difference observed for the respective
variable during the sample period. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001)
normalize the difference between the actual and the forecast values
by the standard deviation of this difference during the sample period.
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) do not normalize their variables.
5 Following Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003), we use the (unscaled)
change in the price of the federal funds futures contract due to expire
in the following month if the FOMC meeting took place within the
last seven calendar days of the month.
6 For a discussion of measures of market expectations concerning
monetary policy actions, see Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002).
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Number of Data Releases That Match Inflation Compensation Observations
Data series (FOMC communication and actions) OTR measure CM measure
Auto sales 75 (78) 51 (54)
Business inventories 76 (78) 54 (54)
Capacity utilization 77 (78) 54 (54)
Civilian unemployment rate 75 (78) 54 (54)
Construction spending 75 (78) 51 (54)
Consumer confidence 76 (78) 54 (54)
Consumer credit 77 (78) 54 (54)
Consumer price index (CPI-U) 75 (78) 54 (54)
CPI excluding food and energy 75 (78) 54 (54)
Durable goods orders 75 (78) 54 (54)
Employment cost index (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
Existing home sales 76 (78) 54 (54)
Factory orders 75 (78) 53 (54)
Federal funds target: unscheduled FOMC meetings* 4 (4) 2 (3)
Federal funds target: scheduled FOMC meetings* 51 (52) 36 (36)
GDP price index (advance) (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
GDP price index (final) (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
GDP price index (preliminary) (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
Goods and services trade balance (surplus) 76 (78) 54 (54)
Greenspan speeches, testimonies other than semi-annual testimony to Congress* 130 (135) 89 (90)
Hourly earnings 75 (78) 54 (54)
Housing starts 76 (78) 53 (54)
Industrial production 77 (78) 54 (54)
Initial jobless claims (W) 323 (334) 224 (234)
Leading indicators 75 (78) 53 (54)
Purchasing Managers’ Index 75 (78) 51 (54)
New home sales 75 (78) 53 (54)
Nonfarm payrolls 75 (78) 54 (54)
Nonfarm productivity (preliminary) 16 (17) 17 (17)
Nonfarm Productivity (revised) 17 (17) 17 (17)
Personal consumption expenditures 75 (78) 53 (54)
Personal income 75 (78) 53 (54)
Producer price index (PPI) 76 (78) 54 (54)
PPI excluding food and energy 76 (78) 54 (54)
Real GDP (advance) (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
Real GDP (final) (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
Real GDP (preliminary) (Q) 25 (26) 18 (18)
Retail sales 76 (78) 54 (54)
Retail sales excluding autos 76 (78) 54 (54)
Semi-annual testimony to Congress* 12 (13) 8 (9)
Treasury budget (surplus) 74 (78) 53 (54)
Truck sales 75 (78) 51 (54)
NOTE: Monthly series if not indicated otherwise (Q, quarterly; W, weekly). Numbers in parentheses indicate total number of obser-
vation, not all of which are used because of missing observations for the measures of inflation compensation.
*Variables not included in the dataset of macroeconomic data releases.
Table 1
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(3) ,
where π ˆt – π ˆt–1 is change in the inflation compensa-
tion from trading day t–1 to trading day t, D is an
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if all explanatory
variables are equal to 0 (and is equal to 0 otherwise),
xt
k is the surprise component in the macroeconomic
data release, fft is the surprise component in the
Federal Reserve action (the federal funds target vari-
able), and εt is an identically and independently
distributed error term with mean 0 and finite variance
σ
2.7The dependent variable is, alternately, the OTR
and the CM measures of inflation compensation.8
We expect signs on the surprises in the macro-
economic data releases to be consistent with the
conventional macroeconomic theory as taught in
the classroom. Bernanke (2003) presents a brief
summary of this theory using the expectations-
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35 augmented Phillips curve. In this model, inflation
depends on inflation expectations, the output gap,
and supply shocks. The most important determinant
of inflation is the expectation component. Anything
that causes people to expect more inflation is likely
to lead to behavior that causes higher inflation. Fore-
casting models and studies using surveys of inflation
expectations show that the most important variable
in predicting future inflation is past inflation.9 There-
fore, we expect surprise increases in price indices
(such as the CPI or PPI) to lead to higher inflation
expectations.
We assume that real variables affect inflation
indirectly through the output gap, that potential
output is relatively stable (as measured by the
Congressional Budget Office, CBO), and that most
news about real activity is news about aggregate
demand. Therefore a surprise increase in any subset
of real economic activity may lead to expectations
of higher inflation. The Phillips curve model also
performs better if we account for supply shocks. A
surprise in real activity may be associated with a
supply shock rather than an aggregate demand
shock. The real variable included in this study that
9 See Stock and Watson (1999) for evidence about the role of past
inflation and real variables in predicting inflation.
Frequency Distribution of Coincidence in Surprises
Number of observations
MMS survey, 
MMS survey and  federal funds target, and 
federal funds target Federal Reserve communication
Number of surprises
per trading day OTR CM OTR CM
0 453 323 415 298
1 487 335 488 329
2 345 249 355 265
3 147 112 159 113
4 86 68 96 79
5 21 10 25 13
6 10 9 10 8
73 2 3 3
81 1 2 1
92 1 2 1
Total 1,555 1,110 1,555 1,110
Table 2
7 The intercept indicator variable, D, eliminates the influence on the
observed mean of the dependent variable of those observations for
which none of the explanatory variables contains information pertinent
to the measured inflation compensation.
8 Using kernel estimation, we verified that the dependent variables
are close to normally distributed. Yet, there is mild (and statistically
significant) skewness (OTR: 0.402; CM: 0.409) and excess kurtosis
(OTR: 1.673; CM: 1.114).
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is explicitly thought to measure changes in aggregate
supply is labor productivity.
The expected sign of the federal funds target
variable is negative. Remember that this variable
measures the surprise in the choice of the federal
funds target rate at scheduled and unscheduled
FOMC meetings. We predict economic agents to
revise down (up) their expected rate of inflation in
response to FOMC actions that are indicative of
monetary policy tighter (easier) than expected.
Tables 3 and 4 show the regression results for
the OTR and CM measures, respectively.10 The
regression coefficients of the federal funds target
variable have the expected sign and are statistically
significant. A surprise in the expected federal funds
target rate of 10 basis points reduces the expected
rate of inflation by 2.2 basis points (OTR measure)
and 1 basis point (CM measure), respectively. The
macroeconomic data series that prove statistically
significant are ranked in Table 5 by the magnitude
of their influence on each measure’s (OTR and CM)
inflation expectations. Remember that all macro-
economic data items are on the same scale (scaled
by their standard deviation). Data releases whose
surprise component proved statistically significant
in the Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003, Table 3)
study, are noted with an asterisk. All statistically
significant regression coefficients have the expected
sign, except consumer credit and housing starts.11
Greater than expected numbers for consumer credit
and housing starts numbers might be thought of as
“bullish”; yet, the regression coefficient is negative.
The six common variables whose surprise compo-
nents bear most heavily on both measures of infla-
tion expectations are the employment cost index,
the Purchasing Managers’ Index, CPI, retail sales,
factory orders, and personal income. The capacity
utilization rate was the most significant mover of
inflation expectations using the CM measure, while
the ECI mattered the most in the OTR measure.
We repeat the regression analysis (3) for the
core measures of CPI, PPI, and retail sales. That is,
we replace the respective comprehensive (total)
numbers in model (3) by CPI excluding food and
energy, PPI excluding food and energy, and retail
sales excluding automotive. These regression results,
which are not shown, have less explanatory power
than the regression equations with the comprehen-
sive numbers, as judged by the R
2. Further, while
CPI retains its statistical significance, retail sales do
not; PPI remains statistically significant only for
the OTR measure. The results for the federal funds
target variable are nearly unchanged.
Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002) argue that
monetary policy surprises as gauged by the change
in federal funds futures prices are measured with
error. This is because federal funds futures prices
not only change in response to monetary policy
actions, but also respond to other information per-
tinent to the future path of the federal funds rate.
Because of the measurement error introduced by
such ambient price changes of federal funds futures
contracts, the regression coefficient of the federal
funds target variable is biased toward 0. We deal
with the error-in-variables problem by employing an
instrumental-variables approach. As an instrument
for the federal funds target, we use an indicator that
is equal to 1 if the federal funds target exceeds its
median positive value, equal to –1 if it falls short of
its median negative value, and 0 otherwise.12
Table 6 shows the regression results of the instru-
mental-variables approach applied to equation (3).
We use two different definitions of the surprise
component of monetary policy actions (the federal
funds target variable). First, we provide results for
the concept that we have used throughout the
paper—the measure suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2003), which is denoted federal funds
target (GSS) in the table. Second, we present results
for the surprise measure devised by Poole and Rasche
(2000), which is denoted federal funds target (PR) in
the table. Unlike the GSS measure, which rests on
the scaled price change of the current month’s
federal funds futures contract (unless the monetary
policy surprise happens within the last seven days
of the month), the PR measure always uses the price
change of the next month's federal funds futures
contract. One of the regression coefficients for the
federal funds target (GSS) is indeed larger (in absolute
value) than without the error-in-variables correction
(Table 4, CM measure), while the other is smaller
(Table 3, OTR measure); also, both federal funds
10 The t-statistics and the F-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987)
corrected standard errors. We applied a standard lag length of
floor(4(T/100)2/9), where floor(.) indicates rounding down to the
nearest integer and T is the number of observations. This lag length
is also used for the Ljung-Box statistic shown in the tables.
11 Note that deficits in the Treasury budget and the trade balance are
recorded as negative numbers. In other words, a positive surprise
component in these variables indicates a deficit that is smaller than
expected in absolute value or a surplus that is greater than expected.
12 For details on this error-in-variables approach, see Greene (2002).
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Regression Results for the 10-year OTR Measure
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-statistic
Auto sales –3.250 · 10
–5 –0.011
Business inventories 2.928 · 10
–3 0.808
Capacity utilization 3.395 · 10
–3 0.514
Civilian unemployment rate –2.759 · 10
–3 –1.612
Construction spending –1.604 · 10
–3 –0.892
Consumer confidence 3.643 · 10
–3 2.237**
Consumer credit –2.157 · 10
–3 –1.658*
Consumer price index (CPI-U) 1.016 · 10
–2 2.109**
Durable goods orders 1.760 · 10
–3 0.800
Employment cost index 1.223 · 10
–2 2.673***
Existing home sales –5.957 · 10
–7 –0.497
Factory orders 8.538 · 10
–3 3.210***
Federal funds target –2.194 · 10
–1 –2.424**
GDP price index (advance) 8.201 · 10
–3 1.602
GDP price index (final) 3.793 · 10
–3 1.900*
GDP price index (preliminary) 1.617 · 10
–3 0.816
Goods and services trade balance (surplus) –4.242 · 10
–3 –2.764***
Hourly earnings 4.269 · 10
–3 1.773*
Housing starts –3.087 · 10
–3 –1.806*
Industrial production 7.385 · 10
–3 1.297
Initial jobless claims –1.840 · 10
–3 –1.996**
Leading indicators 2.114 · 10
–3 0.526
Purchasing Managers’ Index 1.045 · 10
–2 4.757***
New home sales 4.375 · 10
–3 2.310**
Nonfarm payrolls 4.099 · 10
–3 2.673***
Nonfarm productivity (preliminary) –2.588 · 10
–3 –0.545
Nonfarm productivity (revised) –2.398 · 10
–3 –0.334
Personal consumption expenditures –6.524 · 10
–4 –0.211
Personal income 5.176 · 10
–3 1.730*
Producer price index (PPI) –1.634 · 10
–3 –0.954
Real GDP (advance) 1.010 · 10
–3 0.185
Real GDP (preliminary) –2.305 · 10
–3 –0.641
Real GDP (final) –7.614 · 10
–3 –1.042
Retail sales 1.015 · 10
–2 2.748***
Treasury budget (surplus) –1.121 · 10
–2 –2.117**
Truck sales 6.420 · 10
–4 0.247
Intercept indicator variable (D) –1.434 · 10
–3 –0.587









Rao’s score test 13.16***
Number of nonzero observations 1,100
Number of observations 1,555
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels (t-tests are two-tailed). F-statistics and t-statistics are Newey and
West (1987) corrected. Federal funds target is not included in the MMS survey. F-statistic (1): all MMS survey variables and federal
funds target; F-statistic (2): all MMS survey variables. The number of nonzero observations indicates the number of trading days
where Federal Reserve communication or the surprise in a monetary policy action was priced.
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Regression Results for the 10-year CM Measure
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-statistic
Auto sales –4.363 · 10
–4 –0.152
Business inventories 2.325 · 10
–3 0.528
Capacity utilization 1.241 · 10
–2 2.082**
Civilian unemployment rate –1.669 · 10
–3 –0.734
Construction spending –2.740 · 10
–3 –1.441
Consumer confidence 3.046 · 10
–3 2.012**
Consumer credit –2.680 · 10
–3 –1.896*
Consumer price index (CPI-U) 7.698 · 10
–3 1.723*
Durable goods orders 2.075 · 10
–3 0.743
Employment cost index 9.162 · 10
–3 2.038**
Existing home sales 8.273 · 10
–4 0.591
Factory orders 6.343 · 10
–3 2.008**
Federal funds target –9.907 · 10
–2 –3.071***
GDP price index (advance) 1.466 · 10
–2 1.193
GDP price index (final) 4.147 · 10
–3 2.350**
GDP price index (preliminary) 3.469 · 10
–3 2.049**
Goods and services trade balance (surplus) –2.121 · 10
–3 –1.534
Hourly earnings 5.752 · 10
–3 1.998*
Housing starts –4.455 · 10
–3 –2.149**
Industrial production 2.740 · 10
–3 0.681
Initial jobless claims –2.160 · 10
–3 –2.048**
Leading indicators 7.567 · 10
–4 0.210
Purchasing Managers’ Index 1.086 · 10
–2 5.221***
New home sales 2.574 · 10
–3 1.505
Nonfarm payrolls 3.921 · 10
–3 1.818*
Nonfarm productivity (preliminary) –6.456 · 10
–3 –1.073
Nonfarm productivity (revised) –1.675 · 10
–3 –0.246
Personal consumption expenditures –1.184 · 10
–5 –0.025
Personal income 6.184 · 10
–3 1.696*
Producer price index (PPI) –1.845 · 10
–3 –0.878
Real GDP (advance) 9.222 · 10
–3 1.500
Real GDP (preliminary) –2.707 · 10
–3 –0.668
Real GDP (final) –4.609 · 10
–3 –0.700
Retail sales 8.745 · 10
–3 2.127**
Treasury budget (surplus) –6.082 · 10
–3 –1.208
Truck sales –4.671 · 10
–4 –0.153
Intercept indicator variable (D) –2.896 · 10
–4 –1.070









Rao’s score test 1.352
Number of nonzero observations 785
Number of observations 1,110
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels (t-tests are two-tailed). F-statistics and t-statistics are Newey and
West (1987) corrected. Federal funds target is not included in the MMS survey. F-statistic (1): all MMS survey variables and federal
funds target; F-statistic (2): all MMS survey variables. The number of nonzero observations indicates the number of trading days
where Federal Reserve communication or the surprise in a monetary policy action was priced.
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target (PR) coefficients are larger in magnitude when
corrected (original estimates not shown).
Finally, we turn to the influence of Federal
Reserve communication. As discussed above, the
surprise component in Federal Reserve communi-
cation is next to impossible to ascertain. Yet, follow-
ing Kohn and Sack (2003), we can analyze the effect
of Federal Reserve communication on the (condi-
tional) volatility of the dependent variable. Specifi-
cally, we are interested in whether Federal Reserve
communication and surprises in monetary policy
actions bear on inflation rate uncertainty. Intuitively,
one might expect Federal Reserve communication
to decrease the uncertainty surrounding the future
rate of inflation as the chairman of the Federal
Reserve offers guidance about the future path of
monetary policy. Also, one might expect that mone-
tary policy actions that take the market by surprise
will increase uncertainty about future inflation.
Note that, if Federal Reserve communication and
surprises in monetary policy actions bear on inflation
uncertainty, then the error term of the regression
equation (3) is heteroskedastic. Rao’s score test on
heteroskedasticity shows that the null hypothesis
of no heteroskedasticity is indeed rejected for the
OTR measure of inflation compensation (Table 3)
but not for the CM inflation compensation measure
(Table 4).13
To address the issue of inflation uncertainty,
we use the squared residuals from regression equa-
tion (3)—the regression results of which are shown
in Tables 3 and 4—in an estimation approach sug-
gested by Amemiya (1977, 1978). We regress these
squared residuals on the federal funds target variable,
an indicator variable that is equal to 1 on days where
Federal Reserve communication was priced in the
market (and 0 otherwise), and the previously intro-
duced intercept indicator variable (D). The regression
13 For Rao’s score test, see Amemiya (1985).
Ranking of Macroeconomic Data Releases by Impact on Inflation Expectations
Data release OTR sign (+/–) CM sign (+/–) OTR rank CM rank
Employment cost index* + + 1 4
Capacity utilization 0 + N/A 1
Treasury budget (surplus) – 0 2 N/A
Purchasing Managers’ Index + + 3 2
Consumer price index (CPI-U) + + 4 5
Retail sales* + + 5 3
Factory orders + + 6 6
Personal income + + 7 7
New home sales* – 0 8 N/A
Hourly earnings + 0 9 N/A
Goods and services trade balance (surplus) + + 10 8
Nonfarm payrolls + + 11 11
GDP price index (final) + + 12 10
Consumer confidence* + + 13 13
Housing starts – – 14 9
Consumer credit* – – 15 14
Initial jobless claims – – 16 15
GDP price index (preliminary) 0 + N/A 10
NOTE: Variables in Tables 3 and 4 that are significant at the 10 percent level (based on two-tailed t-tests) are ranked above; 0 is not
significant.
*Five of the six variables that turned out statistically significant in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2003, Table 3).
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Instrumental-Variables Approach
Panel A: OTR measure
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-statistic
Federal funds target (GSS) –2.016 · 10
–1 –2.710**
Federal funds target (PR) –2.659 · 10
–1 –3.191***
Panel B: CM measure
Explanatory Variable Coefficient t-statistic
Federal funds target (GSS) –1.671 · 10
–1 –2.975***
Federal funds target (PR) –1.239 · 10
–1 –2.575**
NOTE: ***/** Indicate significance at the 1/5 percent levels (t-tests are two-tailed; t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) corrected).
GSS and PR indicate the federal funds market measure for monetary policy surprises as suggested by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2002) and Poole and Rasche (2000), respectively.
Table 6
Inflation Uncertainty
Panel A: OTR measure
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-statistic
Federal Reserve communication –8.632 · 10
–3 –3.989***
Federal funds target 1.547 · 10
–3 4.009***
Intercept indicator variable (D) 9.189 · 10
–4 4.017***
Intercept 1.049 · 10
–3 4.157***
Number of nonzero observations 166
Number of observations 1,555
Panel B: CM measure
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-statistic
Federal Reserve communication 3.021 · 10
–3 1.295
Federal funds target 5.160 · 10
–4 1.107
Intercept indicator variable (D) 4.173 · 10
–4 1.104
Intercept 1.381 · 10
–3 3.740***
Number of nonzero observations 117
Number of observations 1,110
NOTE: *** Indicates significance at the 1 percent level (t-tests are two-tailed). The variable Federal Reserve communication equals 1
on trading days on which Chairman Greenspan’s semi-annual testimony to Congress (formerly known as Humphrey-Hawkins testimony)
or speeches and other testimonies of Chairman Greenspan were priced in the market. The number of nonzero observations indicates
the number of trading days where Federal Reserve communication or the surprise in a monetary policy action was priced.
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results, which are presented in Table 7, indicate that
neither Federal Reserve communication nor mone-
tary policy surprises bear on the conditional variance
of the CM measure of inflation compensation. This
finding is not surprising, given that Rao's score test
does not suggest heteroskedasticity. Things are differ-
ent with the OTR measure of inflation compensation.
Here, Rao's score test indicates heteroskedasticity,
and, indeed, the coefficients for the variables Federal
Reserve communication and federal fund target are
statistically significant and have the expected sign.
Hence, we conclude that, at least judged by one of
our two measures of inflation compensation, Federal
Reserve communication diminishes the uncertainty
surrounding the future rate of inflation, while sur-
prises in monetary policy actions increase it.
CONCLUSION
Do monetary policy actions that are tighter or
easier than expected by the federal funds futures
market bear on the average rate of inflation that
economic agents expect to prevail over the next 10
years? Moreover, do surprises in macroeconomic
data releases lead economic agents to update their
beliefs about the average rate of inflation they expect
for the next 10 years; if so, which data series matter
the most? We gauged inflation expectations by two
different measures of inflation compensation, both
of which are derived from the market valuation of
the expected cash flows of nominal and inflation-
indexed Treasury securities. 
We find that surprises in monetary policy actions
bear on both measures of inflation expectations.
Monetary policy actions that are viewed as tighter
(easier) than expected by the market lead economic
agents to revise down (up) their expected rate of
inflation. Further, one measure indicates that Federal
Reserve communication reduces uncertainty about
the future rate of inflation, while surprises in mone-
tary policy actions increase uncertainty about the
path the rate of inflation is going to take. We also
show that surprises in macroeconomic data releases
matter. In particular, we show that the surprise com-
ponents in data releases for the employment cost
index, the Purchasing Managers’ Index, CPI, retail
sales, factory orders, and personal income bear most
heavily on both measures of inflation expectations.
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